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At this moment, two members of the United States Army's 3rd
Infantry, The Old Guard, keep watch over the Tomb of the Unknowns in
Arlington National Cemetery.' These Sentinels pace silently back and
forth, marching solemnly at a constant cadence for a distance of twenty-2
one paces. They stop to turn and face the Tomb for twenty-one seconds,
then reverse their course with rigid precision. A ceremonial change of
the guard occurs, but the eternal watch never falters, as another pair of
stoic Sentinels takes their place.3 Day and night, rain or shine, they keep
a constant vigil as a sharp, biting wind sweeps in from the Potomac.
Such is how we honor our dead.
In Soldier Dead,4 Michael Sledge outlines the burial of soldiers
and the efforts to recover their remains decades after the war in which
they had fought has ended. On the battlefield, soldiers may bury their
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008.
Editor's Note: As this issue goes to press, the Department of Veterans
Affairs has settled a lawsuit that is a major focus of this Note. As part of the
settlement agreement, the Department has added a Wiccan Pentacle to its list of
approved symbols for memorial markers. See Neela Banerjee, Use of Wiccan
Symbol on Veterans' Headstones Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007, at A2 1.
Although the controversy surrounding the specific headstone markers discussed in
this note has now been resolved, the legal analysis herein remains relevant as to
service members who may seek the Department's approval of additional religious
headstone symbols in the future.
1. Arlington National Cemetery, Ceremonies: The Sentinels of the Tomb of
the Unknowns, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.org/ceremonies/sentinelsotu.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. MICHAEL SLEDGE, SOLDIER DEAD: How WE RECOVER, IDENTIFY, BURY, AND
HONOR OUR MILITARY FALLEN (2005).
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dead out of necessity due to hygiene concerns for the surviving members
of the unit. 5 However, the motivation for burials at the front line often
goes beyond practical concerns, where soldiers have either buried or
refused to leave the bodies of their fallen comrades behind at the risk of
6their own lives. Marines did this at Iwo Jima, working to bury their
dead during battle.7 Army Rangers and Delta Force Operators in
Somalia likewise refused to leave the bodies of helicopter pilots behind
while fighting a pitched battle in an urban area against overwhelming
8numbers of local militiamen. The moral obligation that soldiers feel to
recover and honor their fallen comrades is linked to the morale of the
survivors, to remove the randomness of death on the battlefield and
restore order to chaos, even if in a limited sense. 9 Author Barbara
Ehrenreich has suggested that the instinct to bury the dead goes back
150,000 years, and may be rooted in an effort to deny our corpses to our
natural predators, a remnant of a time when humans were not at the top
of the food chain. 10 "[T]o bury the human dead is to cheat the beasts: to
refuse, even in death, to accept the status of prey."' I Long after battles
and wars have ended, Americans have sought to recover and honor the
dead for other reasons. In pursuit of forensic analyses of the causes of
death, to provide closure for the families of the fallen, and as a matter of
national pride, to this day we continue recovery of World War II, Korean
War, and Vietnam veterans' remains. 
12
Soldier Dead is not always unknown, and not all receive the
same honors. Sergeant Patrick Stewart, 35, of the Army National
Guard's 113th Aviation Regiment, was killed in action with four other
soldiers when their CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter crashed on
September 25th, 2005 southwest of Deh Chopan, Afghanistan, in support
5. Id. at 14-15.
6. Id. at 15-21.
7. Id. at 17.
8. See MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR
(1999).
9. See SLEDGE supra note 4, at 15-21.
10. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES: ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE
PASSIONS OF WAR 78-79 (1997).
11. Id. at 79 (alteration added).
12. See SLEDGE supra note 4, at 8-29, 268-296.
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of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.1 3 Sergeant Stewart made his
final sacrifice at the "tip of the spear," in a hostile region of Afghanistan
that has been hotly contested almost since the Taliban's initial defeat.'
4
He is one of thousands of American service members killed in action
during military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but he was not treated
the same as his fellow soldiers. Sergeant Stewart was a Wiccan, an
adherent of the nature-focused "modem witchcraft" known as Wicca.
His wife, Roberta, requested a distinctive Wiccan symbol for his marker
on the memorial wall at the Northern Nevada Veterans Memorial
Cemetery, but the Department of Veterans Affairs denied that request.1
5
Nearly a year after Sergeant Stewart's death, the Nevada Attorney
General's office determined that the Nevada Office of Veterans Services,
and not the federal government, had the authority to grant a plaque that
recognized the Wiccan religion.16 This Nevada action provided Sergeant
Stewart with a Pentacle, an upright five-pointed star within a circle. 17
Federal regulations currently provide for eligible veterans to
receive a headstone or memorial marker at the government's expense.18
Only those who died in active service, their surviving spouses or minor
children, or those whose service entitles them to retirement pay are
eligible for burial in National Cemeteries and receipt of a government-
supplied headstone.' 9 The Department of Veterans Affairs controls
veterans' memorial markers through its subordinate National Cemetery
20Administration, overseen by the Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs.
13. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., DoD Identifies Army Casualties (Sept.
26, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr2O0509264803.
html.
14. See Warrant Officer 1 Michael Mclnerney, The Battle for Deh Chopan
Afghanistan, Part I, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Aug. 2004, available at
http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,SOF_0804_Afghanistan 1,00.html
(chronicling a Special Forces Detachment's combat with hundreds of Taliban
fighters in the Deh Chopan area in August 2002).
15. Sean Whaley, Sergeant's Space Left Blank, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL,
Mar. 2, 2006, at IA.
16. Sean Whaley, Soldier Will Get Wiccan Symbol on Memorial Plaque, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Nevada), Sept. 14, 2006, at lB.
17. Id.
18. See 38 C.F.R. § 38.630(c) (2006).
19. 38 C.F.R. § 38.620.
20. 38 C.F.R. § 2.6(f).
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Inscriptions on headstones or markers must be in accordance with the• • 21
Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs' policies. The entitlement is not
without limits, and only some religions have representative symbols
available. To receive such a symbol, the family of a fallen veteran must
22
request it through a standardized government form. This form offers
thirty-eight different religious markers for different faiths,
accommodating Christians, Buddhists, Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, and
23
Hindus. Wiccans have no symbol that is recognized by the Department
24of Veterans Affairs, though the National Cemetery Administration has
approved symbols to represent atheists and humanists.
25
Though Sergeant Stewart received his Pentacle, the pursuit of his
cause endures. It was a state, not federal, action that granted him a
Wiccan religious symbol for his marker on the memorial wall. No
federal action has been taken that would grant future Wiccan service
members memorial recognition of their faith in the current federal
veterans' entitlements.
Thus, the First Amendment controversy implicit in federal
refusal to honor Wiccan soldiers with distinctive memorial markers is
still very much alive. Americans United for the Separation of Church
and State, along with two Wiccan groups, Circle Sanctuary and the Isis
Invicta Military Mission, recently filed a complaint in the United States
26
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The American
Civil Liberties Union has also filed a complaint in the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans on behalf of three similarly-situated
27
Wiccan petitioners. The ACLU brief alleges unwarranted procedural
delays in approving a 1997 application for Wiccan memorial markers,
pointing out that several other religions have recently been awarded
21. 38 C.F.R. § 38.630(b).
22. VA Form 40-1330, available at http://www.va.gov/vaforms/va/pdf/VA40-
1330.pdf.
23. See id. at 4.
24. See id
25. See id.
26. See Complaint, Circle Sanctuary v. Nicholson, No. 06-C-00600 (W.D.
Wisc., Nov. 13, 2006).
27. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Veterans Denied Right to
Post Religious Symbol on Headstones, ACLU Charges (Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/religion/discrim/26970prs20060929.html.
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emblems to represent their faiths while Wiccans have received neither
28approval nor disapproval of the Pentacle.
"Wicca" refers to "an initiatory Pagan religion developed by
Gerald B. Gardner" or "[a]ny new Pagan religion inspired by, similar to,
or developed from 'Gardnerian' Wicca, generally including invocation of
a male and female deity in a ritual circle marked by four quarter points,
and following a ritual calendar with eight holy days ('Sabbats'). '
Gardner was a British civil servant who published the seminal works
Witchcraft Today in 1954 and The Meaning of Witchcraft in 1959.30
Wicca has been recognized as a religion in federal courts.31
Department of Defense statistics indicate that there are more
than 1,800 self-identified Wiccans currently serving in our armed
32forces. The religion is sufficiently popular with soldiers that Wiccan
services are included in chaplain-published worship schedules at Army
troop installations such as Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Fort Hood, Texas,
and Fort Polk, Louisiana.33 The Department of Defense mentions Wicca
in its support literature for chaplains, including special guidelines for
accommodating the religion.34
28. Brief of Petitioner at 8-16, Kathleen Egbert v. Nicholson, No. 06-2773
(Vet. App. Sept. 29, 2006).
29. CHAS S. CLIFTON, HER HIDDEN CHILDREN: THE RISE OF WICCA AND
PAGANISM IN AMERICA 172 (2006) (alteration added).
30. Joanne Pearson, The history and development of Wicca and Paganism, in
BELIEF BEYOND BOUNDARIES: WICCA, CELTIC SPIRITUALITY AND THE NEW AGE 15,
32 (Joanne Pearson ed., 2002).
31. See Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1007 (1987).
32. Leo Shane III, Wiccans Sue VA Over Religious Grave Symbols, STARS AND
STRIPES (Mideast edition), November 14, 2006, available at http://stripes.com/article
.asp?section= 104&article=40497&archive=true.
33. Fort Bragg, Religious Services Schedule, http://www.bragg.army.mil/CIIA
PLAIN/schedule.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2007); Fort Hood Open Circle (Wicca),
http://www.hood.army.mil/CHAPLAIN/ChapWicca.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006);
Fort Polk, Religious Activities, http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/Garrison/chaplain/rel
igious%20activities.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
34. U.S. DEPT. OF ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 165-13-1, Religious Requirements
and Practices of Certain Selected Groups: A Handbook for Chaplains VII-5 - VII- 10
(1978).
404 [Vol. 5
2007] THESE DISHONORED DEAD 405
This Note analyzes the potential First Amendment claims of
35members of Wiccan or other religious minority groups. Part I asks
35. This Note does not address Free Speech claims because they are unlikely
to succeed. Generally, religious speakers can pursue a claim under Free Speech
rights. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760
(1995) (holding religious speech may be as protected under Free Speech standards as
secular private expression). The application to government-provided headstones for
veterans is less promising. If viewed in a military environment, the need for
discipline in a military setting has consistently defeated Free Speech claims by
service members. See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (holding that
an army officer's conviction for criticism of the Vietnam conflict and encouraging
African-American soldiers to refuse assignments there did not impermissibly burden
his Free Speech rights); United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 124 (2001) (holding
proper a soldier's conviction for disobeying an order to wear his uniform with
United Nations accoutrements); United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797 (1991)
(holding that disciplining a military policeman for blowing his nose on the American
flag did not violate his Free Speech rights).
Under mainstream First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have refused to
recognize cemeteries as traditional public forums for political or religious
expression. See generally Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 947 (2002) (upholding National Cemetery
Administration rule that regulated the display of the Confederate flag at a national
cemetery); Jackson v. City of Stone Mountain, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (upholding on Due-Process grounds the removal of a flagpole that plaintiffs
installed in a city-owned cemetery to display the Confederate flag); Koehl v. Resor,
296 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970) (upholding
regulations which barred Nazi Party regalia at a funeral in a National Cemetery);
Lower v. Bd. of Dirs., 56 P.3d 235 (Kan. 2002) (upholding removal of a non-
headstone monument memorializing unborn babies as a class).
The "limited public forum" class of cases may seem attractive to petitioners, on
the theory that headstones and memorial plaques, taken collectively, are limited
public forums, forums that are non-public except for specified uses. Under this
theory, the Supreme Court has invalidated measures in educational settings that
excluded parties that intended to express a religiously-guided viewpoint. See, e.g.,
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (holding that a school
district could not bar a Bible-study class for children when it allowed access to its
facilities for secular civic groups); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a public university could not deny funds for a
student journal because the viewpoint expressed was religious in nature); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that a
school district could not bar a church from showing films on child-rearing on school
property when secular groups met there for parallel civic purposes). A federal
district court has found that cemeteries are not limited public forums. See Warner v.
City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (holding that a city
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whether the denial of a distinctive symbol on memorial plaques accord
with the Free Exercise rights of Wiccan soldiers. Part II identifies the
Establishment Clause issues raised when the government recognizes
some religions and specified sects for memorial markers but not others.
This Note finds that the current denial of a distinctive marker to Wiccan
service members violates both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.
I. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION FOR WICCAN SOLDIERS
The claim of a Wiccan petitioner is at heart a Free Exercise
issue: recognition of a service member's chosen religious faith, after the
36
soldier's passing. But as with other First Amendment claims, Free
Exercise has a different standard in the military context as opposed to the
civilian context. This section first explores the standard applied to Free
Exercise claims in the military. Finding the underlying rationale for this
standard inapplicable to headstone engravings, this Note then explores
the claim of Wiccan petitioners under mainstream Free Exercise
jurisprudence.
A. Goldman v. Weinberger and Deference to Military Regulations
There is considerable precedent establishing the proper balance
between the rights of service members to practice their religions and the
need for military chains of command to maintain discipline within their
ordinance mandating ground-level headstones for ease of grounds-keeping did not
violate Free Speech or Free Exercise rights, and that no relief was available under
limited public forum doctrine).
A court reviewing Free Speech claims will find that memorial symbols on
government-provided headstones-many placed in National Cemeteries owned and
operated by the federal government-are not limited public forums. The display of a
religious symbol on stone, meant to weather the elements for centuries, is not
analogous to temporary after-school access to a classroom. This is a private forum
that has traditionally been used to accommodate religious beliefs of deceased
veterans, and a Free Speech claim will likely fail.
36. This Note assumes that the family members of the fallen soldiers have
standing to bring First Amendment challenges. While lack of standing may present
a barrier for litigation, this Note focuses on the merits of potential First Amendment
claims. A full exploration of standing is beyond its scope.
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ranks. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren once noted,
"our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simplyS ,,17
because they have doffed their civilian clothes. On the other hand,
military court decisions have consistently held that service members
38
sacrifice certain individual liberties during active service. A World
War II-era Supreme Court case affirmed the latter principle, pointing out:
"those subject to military discipline are under many duties and may not
claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian
life."
39
In the modem landmark case, Goldman v. Weinberger,4 ° the
Supreme Court further affirmed that service in the military restricts the
Free Exercise rights of service members. Goldman, an Orthodox Jew
and ordained rabbi who was then serving as an Air Force psychologist,
refused to remove his religious head covering while working at a military
hospital in violation of regulations that required most service members to
41remove hats or head coverings indoors.
42
At the time, a restriction on wearing religious apparel normally
would have been evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard in Sherbert
v. Verner.3  Goldman argued for such an analysis, but the Supreme
Court refused, distinguishing military service members' rights from
those of the general public:
44
37. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181,
188 (1962).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Burry, 36 C.M.R. 829 (1966) (holding that a
member of the Coast Guard may be compelled to work on his Saturday Sabbath in
contravention of his religious beliefs); United States v. Chadwell, 36 C.M.R. 741
(1965) (holding a marine could be disciplined for refusing to receive inoculations,
pursuant to his religious convictions).
39. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 n.19 (1943).
40. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
41. Id. at 505.
42. A claim of this type would be analyzed under a different standard today.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); infra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text.
43. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired
for her refusal to work on Saturday could not be denied unemployment
compensation because this would unfairly burden her ability to practice her religion).
44. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-07.
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Our review of military regulations challenged on
First Amendment grounds is far more deferential
than constitutional review of similar laws or
regulations designed for civilian society. The
military need not encourage debate or tolerate
protest to the extent that such tolerance is required
of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to
accomplish its mission the military must foster
distinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
45esprit de corps.
The Goldman Court then affirmed the decision barring Goldman from
46wearing his yarmulke while on-duty. The Goldman precedent has since
been used to affirm command decisions curtailing various individual
freedoms of service members-religious and otherwise.47  Congress
responded to Goldman by revising federal statutes, which now allow
members of the armed forces to wear an item of religious apparel while
wearing their uniforms unless "the wearing of the item would interfere
with the performance of. . . military duties or ... the item of apparel is
not neat and conservative.
48
More recently, military courts have imposed reasonable
restrictions on the practice of Wicca in certain circumstances. In United
States v. Phillips,49 a military court heard the case of a Wiccan soldier
who claimed to be the victim of unconstitutional Free Exercise
restrictions while incarcerated. Army Specialist Phillips was denied
access to religious paraphernalia during a pre-trial confinement for drug
charges.50 Because the case involved a soldier stationed at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, the court looked to a Fourth Circuit ruling, Dettmer v.
45. Id. at 507.
46. Id. at 510.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Lugo, 54 M.J. 558 (2000) (holding prohibition of
male military members wearing earrings was a "lawful general order"); United
States v. McDaniels, 50 M.J. 407 (1999) (holding a commander's order to a
narcoleptic marine not to drive his personal vehicle was proper).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 774(a)-(b) (2000).
49. 42 M.J. 346 (1995).
50. Id. at 347
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Landon,51 for precedent on the Free Exercise rights of Wiccans in a
confinement setting. Herbert Dettmer, an inmate at the Powhatan
Correctional Center, had requested a robe, candles, incense, a kitchen
timer to wake him from meditation, a hollow statue of a deity to "store
spiritual power called down during meditation," and sulfur or sea salt to
"draw a protective circle on the floor around him.",52  Dettmer also
requested a lockbox so that prison officials could secure the items when
53not in use. The government argued that Wicca was not a religion, and
that even if it was, Dettmer's rites were "more akin to meditation" rather1 4
than religious practices. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, ruling that
Wicca occupied a place in the lives of its practitioners "parallel to that of
more conventional religions. 55 The court held that accommodations that
took into account legitimate security concerns were required.56 It further
ruled that while security concerns regarding candles, incense, and salt
provided a basis for exclusion, all prisoners had access to bathrobes or
boxing robes, watches, and clocks. Thus, accommodating these requests
57
posed no legitimate security concerns.
Following Dettmer, the Phillips court held that Wicca was a
religion recognized by both the Department of Defense and the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but that the petitioner's access to certain
religious paraphernalia, such as a ceremonial knife, could properly be
58
denied in a confinement setting. This approach to restrictions on
confined persons puts Wicca in the same stead as other religions: it is a
recognized and permitted religion that is subject to reasonable security
restrictions.
The request for memorial recognition on behalf of deceased
Wiccan service members can be distinguished from both Goldman and
51. 799 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., Dettmer v. Murray,
483 U.S. 1007 (1987).
52. Id. at 930.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 932.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 933.
57. Id. at 933-34. The prison officials feared that sulfur or its substitutes could
be used to make an explosive, that candles could be used as timing devices and to
make impressions of keys, and that incense could be used to mask the odor of
marijuana. Id.
58. United States v. Phillips, 42 M.J. 346, 349 (1995).
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Phillips. The petitioners would not be asking for an exception to a rule
of general applicability based on their religious convictions; rather they
would be asking for their religious convictions to be treated the same as
those of other religions or denominations. Specifically, any petitioner
would be asking for the equivalent memorial recognition that is already
afforded other service members.
The practice of honoring Soldier Dead is as old as organized
warfare itself. Many American formalities find their origins in Greek
and Roman practices. Thucydides gave an account of the treatment of
fallen soldiers involving a three-day wake for the dead, and a funeral
procession where the bones of the fallen moved from a public display
tent to burial sites, with an additional empty coffin in the procession to
represent the bodies that could not be recovered. 59 A visitor to Arlington
National Cemetery can find a similar display at the Tomb of the
Unknowns.60  Traditional honors at military funerals consist of
uniformed pall bearers, a firing party, a bugler, and a chaplain to provide
rites.61 The custom of firing three volleys over the grave of a fallen
warrior comes from Roman funeral rites that called for the casting of dirt
across the body three times, calling the dead by name three times, and
bidding the deceased farewell aloud three times.62 More recently, the
firing of three musket volleys announced that the burying of the dead
63was complete and the burial detail was ready to return to duty.
Congress's desire to provide traditional symbolism for all deceased
veterans prompted a pilot program for the Ceremonial Bugle, an audio
59. See SLEDGE supra note 4, at 233-34.
60. See GEORGE W. DODGE, ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY: IMAGES OF
AMERICA 71-73 (2006). The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was initially filled with
the remains of a man killed in France in World War I. Sergeant Edward F. Younger,
a Distinguished Service Cross recipient, was given the honor of choosing the
remains that would be interred. Four sets of remains retrieved from military
cemeteries in France were gathered in a chapel, and Sergeant Younger selected the
remains by placing a bouquet of roses atop one of the coffins. Sergeant Younger is
interred at Arlington National Cemetery, Section 18, Lot 1918-B, Grid LM-12/13.
See id at 128.
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY FUNERAL
HONORS FOR VETERANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 at 9.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id.
410 [Vol. 5
device placed in the bell of a trumpet.64 Considered more dignified than
a cassette player, it is programmed to play taps and obviates the need for
65trained buglers at all military funerals. Since 1918, the coffins of Army
veterans have been covered with American flags that are ceremonially
folded and given to the soldiers' next of kin following the funeral
66service.
Given the history and nature of a military funeral and the
symbolism fundamental to it, it is difficult to evaluate the refusal of a
memorial marker to Wiccan veterans in the same light as requests to
wear religious clothing while serving on active duty or requests for
access to ceremonial knives in a detention setting. It seems clear that the
governmental interest is not to enforce a rule of general applicability that
maintains discipline at the expense of individual liberties, but instead to
accommodate as many religions as practicable to encourage sacrifice for
the nation and valor in battle. The discipline required to maintain an
operational military or a secure prison is simply not required in the
graveyard. Therefore, judicial review of this selective denial of religious
markers to Wiccan veterans warrants consideration under mainstream
Free Exercise Clause standards.
B. Review Under Mainstream Free Exercise Standards
Rules of general applicability are also applied in mainstream
First Amendment jurisprudence, and the government would likely argue
that the current Veterans Administration requirements for religious
symbols on memorial markers are such rules. In response, Wiccan
petitioners have three potential arguments. First, if the government has
established a rule of general applicability, then the petitioners have
complied with it and there is no reason to bar their approval. Second, the
revisions of Veterans Administration requirements for approval of a new
symbol are aimed at excluding Wiccans and thus render this
governmental practice facially neutral but discriminatory in nature.
Third, the provision of religious symbols recognizing specified sects is
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY FUNERAL
HONORS FOR VETERANS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 at 13.
65. Id.
66. See 1999 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 61 at 3.
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not a rule of general applicability, and this case should be decided on
Establishment Clause grounds.
1. Arguing Within the Rule of General Applicability Framework
Assuming arguendo that the current system of selecting a symbol
for a memorial marker is a rule of general applicability, the current
petitioners may still prevail. The history of Free Exercise jurisprudence
is predominantly one of a plaintiff asking for a religious exemption from
blanket laws or regulations. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court
held that a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired for her refusal to work
on Saturday could not be denied unemployment compensation because
such an action would unfairly burden her ability to practice her
religion.67 The plaintiff in Goldman v. Weinberger sought, but did not
68obtain, such an analysis to authorize his yarmulke. Under the Supreme
Court's holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 69 analysis of a Free Exercise
claim is a balance of the plaintiffs and the government's interests. The
Yoder plaintiffs were Amish and Mennonite parents who sought an
exception to a state statute mandating high school attendance until the
age of sixteen. 70 The Yoder analysis balances the burden placed on a
plaintiffs sincere Free Exercise claim against the government's claim
that its interest outweighs the plaintiffs interests, and that allowing an
exception undermines the governmental policy.
7'
The dominant modern case governing a rule of general
applicability in conflict with a Free Exercise claim is Employment
Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.72 The plaintiffs
in Smith were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation facility
because they ceremonially ingested peyote in conjunction with the
sacraments of the Native American Church, of which both were
members.73 The plaintiffs were subsequently denied unemployment
compensation by the defendant state administration because they had
67. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
68. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
70. Id. at 207
71. Id. at 214-29.
72. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
73. Id. at 874.
[Vol. 5
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been terminated for work-related misconduct.74 Oregon courts held that
the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause.75 The United
States Supreme Court reversed. It held that generally applicable laws
enacted pursuant to state police powers to not offend the First
Amendment, and that invalidation of a law hinges on whether the law's
76object is to burden or prohibit the exercise of the religion. Allowing
citizens to assert religious beliefs as valid excuses to disobey the laws of
the state would ultimately "permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself., 77 Smith also required a hybrid constitutional claim to defeat a
rule of general applicability-the intertwining of a Free Exercise claim
with another fundamental right.78 Thus, claims such as those asserted by
the Amish parents in Yoder-a right to raise their children, coupled with
a Free Exercise claim--could trump a rule of general applicability. 79 It
must be noted, however, that the requirement of a hybrid Free Exercise
claim may limit the usefulness of Smith in the instant case. Federal
courts have already ruled that there is no fundamental right to serve in
the military.8 °
The current rule of general applicability regarding memorial
markers states that "[n]o graphics (logos, symbols, etc.) are permitted on
Government-furnished headstones or markers other than the approved
emblems of belief, the Civil War Union Shield, the Civil War
Confederate Southern Cross of Honor, and the Medal of Honor
insignias." 81 This rule already allows for stars (Star of David, Emblem
#03; Bahai nine-pointed star, Emblem #15; Muslim Crescent and Star,
Emblem #17) and specifically five-pointed stars (Islamic Five-Pointed
82Star, Emblem #98). Presumably, the Wiccan Pentacle is not so
74. Id.
75. Id. at 874-75.
76. Id. at 877-79.
77. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
78. Id. at 881.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Mack v. Rumsfeld, 784 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that an
Army and Air Force policy barring the enlistment of single mothers was
constitutional because of the logistical impediment to deployment for combat).
81. United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Available Emblems of
Belief for Place on Government Headstones and Markers, http://www.cem.va.gov/
cem/hm/hmemb.asp (alteration added) (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
82. See id.
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different from existing emblems that it cannot be reviewed for approval
or disapproval by governing authorities. If there is a reason to
disapprove the Wiccan Pentacle for use on headstones and memorial
markers, it must be due to a failure to fulfill the religious and
denominational requirements for recognition.
The plaintiffs' briefs in both the Veterans Claims and Wisconsin
83courts allege that previous applications by Wiccan groups worked to
meet every requirement for entry into the Veterans Administration
pantheon. The Veterans Claims plaintiffs include the Aquarian
84Tabernacle Church (ATC). ATC, through its Archpriest, the Right
Reverend Pierre C. Davis, a/k/a Pete Pathfinder Davis, first applied for
admission of the Wiccan emblem of belief on August 27, 1997.85 Rev.
Davis alleges that he received no feedback on his application until
November 27, 2001, when the Secretary of Veterans Affairs wrote to
inform him that the Veterans Administration was currently revising its
regulations regarding new emblems of belief.86 The plaintiffs' brief in
the Wisconsin case includes the Isis Invicta Military Mission as
plaintiffs, a group that caters specifically to Wiccans serving on active
duty.87 Rev. Rona Coomer-Russell, the priestess of Isis Invicta, applied
for an emblem in September 1998.88 Rev. Coomer-Russell received
messages from Veterans Administration officials promising future
feedback on the application and revisions of the rules regarding
memorial emblems. She filed a total of three separate applications as
revisions were announced.89
The Wisconsin plaintiffs' brief tracks the revisions of Veterans
Administration regulations in 2001 and 2005. 90  The 2001 revision
allowed for the Department of Veterans Affairs to consider requests for
emblems of belief not on the approved list. To be considered, requests
83. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
84. Brief of Petitioner, Kathleen Egbert v. Nicholson, No. 06-2773 (Ct. Vet.
App. Sept. 29, 2006).
85. Id. at 8.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Complaint, Circle Sanctuary et al. v. Nicholson at 6, No. 06-C-00600
(W.D. Wis., Nov. 13, 2006).
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 14-16.
90. Id. at 11-14.
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must be in writing, be accompanied by a letter approving of the symbol
signed by the recognized head of an affiliated congregation, and include
a copy of the requested emblem. 9l The 2005 revision took into account
the need to process an application for a recently-deceased eligible
92veteran. This revision also included requirements that the belief or
faith system be comprehensive in nature, address the fundamental and
ultimate questions of life and man's purpose, have an organized group of
substantial membership, have ceremonial functions, holidays, clergy, and
other outward characteristics of religion, and not promote activity that is
illegal or contrary to public policy.
93
The current plaintiffs can satisfy all of these requirements.
Recall that the Fourth Circuit ruled in Dettmer v. Landon that the Church
of Wicca occupied a place in the lives of its members parallel to more
conventional religions, answered questions concerning the ultimate
nature of existence and man's role in it, and had practitioners who
worshipped separately and in group ceremonies of some formality. 94 The
requirement for a substantial group of followers is met by Circle
Sanctuary, which claims to have more than 54,000 members in the
United States and publishes a religious periodical that provides readers
with spiritual guidance. Its founder, Rev. Selena Fox, advised the Army
to include in its updated Chaplain's Handbook information on the• 95
Wiccan faith and accommodations that Wiccan soldiers might require.
Rev. Selena Fox is not only the recognized head of a Wiccan
congregation, but is also a religious leader that the Army itself has
sought out for guidance on accommodating Wicca. The mandate for
96holidays is met by Wicca's ritual calendar and its eight Sabbats. The
requirement that the religion not promote activity that is illegal or
contrary to public policy seems handily met by the fact that the military
allows Wiccans to serve in combat and has attempted to accommodate
their faith while on active duty here and abroad.
Wiccan compliance with the guidelines for approval of an
emblem of belief as detailed above requires governmental recognition on
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13.
94. See Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 931-33 (4th Cir. 1986).
95. Complaint, Circle Sanctuary v. Nicholson, supra note 87, at 7-8.
96. See CLIFTON, supra note 29, at 172.
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memorial markers.97 Short of a judicial finding that Wicca does not
constitute a religion-contrary to what other reviewing courts have
found-the Wiccan applicants make a solid case that they have complied
with the requirements for an emblem of belief. The timing of the
changes raises the question of whether they were directed at excluding
Wicca, a topic addressed in the next section.
2. Facially Neutral Discrimination and Procedural Barriers to Wiccan
Recognition
Not all rules of general applicability are given the same amount
of deference by a reviewing court. Laws or ordinances that are facially
neutral but directed at impacting a specific religious group may be more
easily overturned. The Supreme Court dealt with such a measure when it
invalidated a municipal ordinance in Lukumi Babalu v. City of Hialeah.
98
The plaintiffs in Lukumi Babalu were practitioners of Santeria, a fusion
of traditional African and Roman Catholic beliefs. Upon hearing that the
church intended to move to Hialeah, the defendant Florida municipality
enacted an ordinance that banned the killing of an animal in a ritual,
regardless of whether or not the animal was subsequently consumed,
with an express exemption for the commercial slaughter of hogs or
97. It should be noted that the above discussion assumes a direct denial of
Wiccan groups' applications. However, the Wiccan plaintiffs do not allege an
outright denial of their application. The Wiccan plaintiffs may have to prevail on a
claim of denial of process in the continued Veterans Administration revision of its
regulations and failure to provide a response to Wiccan applicants. Such an analysis
is outside of the intended focus of this Note, but unreasonable delay has compelled
federal courts to order an administrative decision in the past. See Telecomm.
Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the D.C.
Circuit Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the Civil Aeronautics Board and
compelled unreasonably delayed agency findings). But see Air Line Pilots Ass'n
Int'l v. CAB, 750 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that while the court had the
power to review a final agency action, the action was not final and the court accepted
agency's assurances that it was moving to resolve the matter in question). Also note
that as a matter of procedure, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin may find that exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the matter properly resides
in the Court of Veterans Appeals and combine the action with the set of plaintiffs in
that court by virtue of the All Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
98. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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cattle. 99 The Court found that the ordinance, though ostensibly aimed at
public health and safety concerns and facially neutral, intended to
discriminate against Santeria worshippers and thus violated the Free
Exercise Clause.'
00
The efforts by Wiccan parties over a nine-year period to comply
with the Department of Veterans Affairs requirements for a symbol,
while other symbols have been approved, can move analysis of this issue
out of the category of a rule of general applicability and into that of a
facially neutral but discriminatory measure. While Wiccan applicants
have received no response, the Veterans Administration has approved six
emblems of belief since the implementation of the 2001 revisions.
According to a letter from Under Secretary for Memorial Affairs William
F. Tuerk, emblems for Christian, Humanist, Presbyterian, Izumo
Taishakyo, Soka Gakkai, and Sikh veterans have been approved since
2002.101 The Sikh emblem was approved on an expedited basis for a
soldier recently killed in combat. 102 Meanwhile, requests for expedited
process on Wiccan applications for three pending funerals, including the
funeral of Sergeant Stewart, have proven unsuccessful.
10 3
To win on a challenge under Lukumi Babalu, Wiccan plaintiffs
will be required to substantiate that the 2001 and 2005 revisions to the
Veterans Administration guidelines for emblems of faith were
specifically intended to exclude Wiccan applicants. The timing of the
revisions, while Wiccan applications for a memorial symbol waited in
limbo, may give a court reason to believe that this new set of hurdles was
emplaced specifically to prevent the approval of a Wiccan symbol. The
2005 revision's requirement for an organized group of substantial
membership may have been aimed at Wicca's relatively small number of
followers and the customary limitation of thirteen adherents for each
Wiccan coven. As stated previously, the addition of the Circle Sanctuary
group to the application process undermines this objection on its face.
In light of Veterans Administration revisions that may be aimed
at excluding previous Wiccan applicants, a court may find that those
99. Id. at 526-27.
100. Id. at 546-47.
101. Complaint, Circle Sanctuary v. Nicholson, supra note 87, at 25-26
102. Id.
103. Id. at 18-21.
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revisions are facially neutral but discriminatory measures. The Wiccan
plaintiffs' single most persuasive argument is that easy and expedited
approval of other religions has occurred while Wiccans have waited.
Unfortunately, there is no extrinsic evidence of such a motivation as
there would be with the legislative history of a suspect statute. In this
category of argument, a victory for Wiccan plaintiffs can only come
through the discovery of prejudicial motives within the Veterans
Administration and thus cannot be determined within this Note.
3. Not a Rule of General Applicability
Petitioners can argue that the process that next of kin go through
to request a religious symbol from the Veterans Administration is not a
rule of general applicability. In contrast to a law or regulation that
speaks without regard to religion-such as a requirement to send
children to public schools or obey state narcotics statutes-this is a
unique practice where the state is in contact with religious congregation
and sect leaders for the purpose of providing symbolic recognition at
taxpayer expense. In Katcoff v. Marsh,104 the Second Circuit faced such
a taxpayer challenge to the Army Chaplaincy, another institution that
explicitly recognizes religions and sects, on the basis that it created an
establishment of religion. The court cited the Supreme Court's
recognition that barring the presence of military chaplains would create a
Free Exercise Clause problem. 105 The Katcoff court further held that the
raising of an Army creates an affirmative obligation "to make religion
available to soldiers who have been moved by the Army to areas of the
world where religion of their own denominations is not available to
them."' 106 If a reviewing court determines that this is a special category
of Free Exercise accommodation that mandates actions that would be
unconstitutional establishments of religion in nearly any other context,
then analysis could be constrained to Establishment Clause holdings.
Thus it is necessary for this Note to consider the Establishment Clause.
104. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 234-35 (discussing Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963)).
106. Id. at 234.
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II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND EMBLEMS OF BELIEF
The broad range of Establishment Clause rulings provides a
virtual grab bag of holdings, many of them context-specific and a great
number of them gaining and losing favor over time with the Supreme
Court. As Professor Steven Gey points out, there are no less than ten
different standards floating in the stream of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.10 7  This section first explores the propriety of using
government funds to provide religious symbols on headstones, then it
looks at the issues presented by allowing recognition of some symbols
but not others.
A. Is Providing Religious Symbols on Headstones an Establishment of
Religion?
How does the practice of providing, at taxpayers' expense,
headstones emblazoned with religious symbols etched in stone fare under
the Establishment Clause? This question may be answered by analogy.
Before any Army veteran is honored with a headstone or memorial
plaque, he or she may receive funeral rites from one of the government-
employed clergy serving as chaplains to American soldiers stationed at
home and abroad. The institution of military chaplains provides a unique
tool to analyze the issue at hand, in that it recognizes religious and
denominational beliefs and affiliations in a military setting and has been
subjected to significant judicial scrutiny in federal courts. Congress has
specifically authorized this activity by statute, describing a corps of
religiously-trained officers composed of a Chief of Chaplains and
subordinate officers. 108 Chaplains provide religious services for the
commands to which they are assigned and perform burial services for
soldiers who die while serving under that command.
09
It is fair to question how the military can employ clergymen
without violating the Establishment Clause. Traditionally, such
Establishment Clause claims have been subject to the three-prong test
107. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND.
L. REv. 1, 36-38 (2006).
108. See 10 U.S.C. § 3073 (2000).
109. 10 U.S.C. § 3547 (2000).
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enumerated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'10 "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, the principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion.""" At issue in Lemon were Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island statutes that subsidized teacher salaries at private
religious schools. 12 If subsidized parochial education is
unconstitutional, how can employing active-duty military clergy be
permissible?
In Marsh v. Chambers,113 the Supreme Court distinguished
government chaplains from other areas of Establishment Clause analysis.
The plaintiff in Marsh v. Chambers challenged the Nebraska unicameral
legislature's practice of employing a chaplain to open each legislative
session with a prayer.' 14  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had
strictly applied the Lemon test, finding that the chaplaincy practice
violated all three prongs of the test.' 15 The Supreme Court reversed,
stating that efforts "[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a public body
entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an
'establishment' of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a
tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of
this country."'1 6 In rejecting arguments that several Founding Fathers
would not approve of the practice, the Court stated:
It can hardly be thought that in the same week
Members of the First Congress voted to appoint
and to pay a chaplain for each house and also voted
to approve the draft of the First Amendment for
submission to the states, they intended the
Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid
what they had just declared acceptable. 117
110. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
111. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
112. Id. at 606-11.
113. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
114. Id. at 784.
115. See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir. 1982).
116. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (alteration added).
117. Id. at 790.
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Military chaplains have also enjoyed explicit exemption from
mainstream Establishment Clause standards. In School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp,118 the Supreme Court held devotional
Bible readings in public schools impermissible but expressly limited its
ruling:
We are not of course presented with and therefore
do not pass upon a situation such as military
service, where the Government regulates the
temporal and geographic environment of
individuals to a point that, unless it permits
voluntary religious services to be conducted with
the use of government facilities, military personnel
would be unable to engage in the practice of their
faiths.' 19
Because of this express exemption, fundamental
accommodations of religious expression in the military-such as worship
services for members of the armed forces and burials that chaplains are
required to consecrate-are not viewed in the same light as other
questioned practices.
The Second Circuit explored a challenge to the Army's
chaplaincy in Katcoff v. Marsh. 12  In Katcoff, plaintiff taxpayers filed
suit claiming that the Army's chaplaincy program fostered excessive
entanglement with religion and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause. 121 The Katcoff court recognized that, viewed in isolation, the
Army's chaplaincy would fail a challenge under the standards put forth
in Lemon.' However, the court rejected strict application of the Lemon
standards, reasoning that the Establishment Clause erects a "blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship.,
123
Citing Marsh v. Chambers, the Katcoff court found the Army's
Chaplains Corps permissible. 124 The Second Circuit also viewed the
118. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
119. Id. at 226 n.10.
120. 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id. at 233 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
124. Id. at 232.
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Army's chaplaincy as a proper exercise of Congress's power to raise
armies. 125 Paralleling the Supreme Court's review of early congressional
actions, the Katcoff court viewed the establishment of the military
chaplaincy both before and contemporaneous with the adoption of the
Establishment Clause as "weighty evidence" that the drafters of the
Constitution did not see military religious activities as impermissible
state establishments of religion.1
26
Further supporting its holding, the Katcoff court pointed out that
the denominational allocations of Army Chaplains are determined by the
entire civilian church population and not the current military religious- • 127
population. Therefore, in the event of a large-scale war or total
mobilization, the distribution of chaplains by denomination would reflect
the newly-mobilized force.128 This practice has been in place since the
Army established the Chief of Chaplains' office in the wake of World
War I, and the distributions of chaplains by denomination have been
updated on the basis of the latest census.129
The Katcoff court further found that denying soldiers access to
chaplains and the religious support they provide would damage "the
morale of our soldiers, their willingness to serve, and the efficiency of
the Army as an instrument for our national defense."'130 This presents a
unique situation where utilitarian concerns demand accommodations of
Free Exercise rights that might otherwise be impermissible under the
Establishment Clause.
Under the first prong of the Lemon test-the requirement for a
secular legislative purpose-a court could look at the provision of
headstones in either a religious or secular light. The act of providing the
headstones, as they were decorated predominantly with Christian crosses
to begin with, might be seen as religiously motivated. However, the
availability of both atheist and humanist symbols likely advantages a
more secular view of the practice: that this is merely a measure to
125. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 225-26.
128. Id.
129. CHAPLAIN ROBERT L. GUSHWA, THE BEST AND THE WORST OF TIMES: THE
UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAINCY VOLUME IV, 1920-1945, at 8-16 (Dep't. of the
Army 1977).
130. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 237.
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remember and honor fallen veterans according to their beliefs. This view
is bolstered by the reasoning in Katcoff that the provision of certain
religious accommodations, regardless of viewpoint, motivates service
members to risk their lives in defense of the nation and creates a more
effective military.1 31 Ultimately, the act of excluding Wiccan service
members would clearly fail the first prong of the Lemon test-not as a
promotion of religion but as animosity toward a disfavored religion.
The second prong of the Lemon test requires the principal or
primary effect of the practice to be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 132  Again, the availability of atheist and humanist symbols
leaves the effect of each headstone or memorial marker as an individual
choice, and service members are neither encouraged nor prohibited from
choosing a symbol from any recognized religion or no religion at all.
However, the exclusion of Wiccan symbols makes the practice
problematic under the second prong as well. It would clearly advance
members of other religions while suppressing Wiccans.
Finally, the practice must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 3 3 The practice of engaging worshippers
and denominations who ask for the reproduction of their religious (or
non-religious) symbols on government-provided headstones is a clear
entanglement with religion. Certainly, the practice of accommodating all
but Wiccans would be seen as excessive entanglement with all other
parties, but the Lemon test is primarily concerned with separating state
and religion as wholesale entities, and is not particularly instructive with
regard to inter-sect rivalries.
Taking Katcoff as a guide can support this use of government
monies in spite of the Lemon test. If provision of religious support to
service members stationed here and abroad is permissible under the
Establishment Clause, then honoring the fallen with .memorial
recognition of their faith follows a parallel logic.
The Katcoff nexus of Free Exercise and national defense is
persuasive in allowing continued federal funding to recognize the faiths
and denominations of fallen soldiers. Military service is one of the few
131. Id.
132. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Ed. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
133. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
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activities in which the government may call upon its citizens to lay down
their lives for their country. Support for the religious practices of
soldiers gives them additional incentive to fight, and possibly die, in
support of the nation, knowing that their sacrifice will be remembered
and honored in a manner they would have wanted. How would armed
forces recruiting fare if those enlisting had to do so knowing that if they
were to die in the line of duty, their loved ones would have to pay out of
their own pockets for a headstone that recognized their faith?
The long-standing tradition of providing memorial markers for
casualties of our wars reinforces the propriety of the practice. Similar to
the long-standing tradition of military chaplains, Congress has been
appropriating funds to bury veterans of American wars for over a century
and a half. As early as 1850, Congress approved funds for a permanent
cemetery in Mexico City for Mexican-American War casualties. 34 The
site most commonly associated with veterans' graves is Arlington
National Cemetery in Virginia. American soldiers have been interred in
Arlington since 1864, initially accommodating the casualties of the
Virginia campaigns of the Civil War. 135 In 1927, Congress approved a
measure to place headstones over the graves of Confederate soldiers,
paralleling the recognition for deceased Union soldiers.' 36 Objections
raised at the time were not based on an alleged violation of church and
state, but on continuing enmity toward the Confederacy.'
37
In sum, providing headstones with religious symbols is
recognition by the government of each deceased veteran's beliefs that is
uniquely permissible because of Free Exercise concerns, and national
defense reasons, and a long-standing, unquestioned history. It falls
134. SLEDGE, supra note 4, at 200.
135. See DODGE, supra note 60, at 8-9. The site of Arlington National
Cemetery was once the home of Confederate General Robert E. Lee and was
occupied by Union troops soon after Lee resigned from the Union Army to
command Virginian Confederate forces. At the order of Union Quartermaster
General Montgomery Meigs, the land was turned into a cemetery for Union soldiers.
Id.
136. See SLEDGE, supra note 4, at 201-02. The Civil War Union and
Confederate emblems remain among the permitted symbols. See United States
Department of Veterans Affairs, Available Emblems of Belief for Place on
Government Headstones and Markers, available at http://www.cem.va.gov/cem/hm/
hmemb.asp.
137. See SLEDGE, supra note 4, at 201-02.
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within the logic of the Katcoff court that we owe a special obligation to
those willing to lay down their lives for the nation, and we excuse any
establishment that occurs because of these unique circumstances.
B. Check Box Below to Indicate Religious Preference (Wiccans Need Not
Apply)
Assuming that a court has determined that the use of religious
symbols on veteran headstones is permissible, this section examines the
acceptance of more popular religions by the Veterans Administration and
the failure to award a symbol to Wiccan petitioners. There are numerous
Establishment Clause precedents that can be used, but only a few are
truly instructive. The strict scrutiny standard employed in Larson v.
Valente138 is the most fitting for an inter-sect rivalry such as this, but
analysis under Lynch v. Donnelly 39 is also worthwhile. The institution
of military chaplains again provides a useful analogy.
1. Inter-Sect Rivalry in the Navy Chaplaincy
In Adair v. England,1 40 a group of current and former Navy
chaplains recently filed suit in a case concerning denominational
preference in a military setting. The plaintiffs alleged that the allocation
of slots in the Navy Chaplains Corps by religion and denomination
violated the Establishment Clause. Starting in the late 1980s, the Navy
departed from the practice of allocating chaplain positions according to
the denominational distribution of the total American population (a
policy still followed by the Army and Air Force) and moved to a more
subjective "needs of the service" policy, which the plaintiffs alleged had
become known as the "thirds policy." '142 This distributed one-third of
slots in the Navy Chaplains Corps for Catholics, one-third for liturgical
Christians, and one-third for non-liturgical Christians and all other
religions. 143  "Liturgical Christians" included Methodist, Lutheran,
138. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
139. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
140. 183 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.D.C. 2002).
141. Id. at 42-44.
142. Id. at 40.
143. Id
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Episcopal and Reformed Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal, Reformed, and
Orthodox Christians. 14 The plaintiffs alleged that while Catholics and
liturgical Christians comprised less than one-third of the Navy's total
personnel when combined, clergy for those denominations were allotted
two-thirds of the chaplain slots-an unconstitutional preference of some
sects over others.
145
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
strict-scrutiny test put forth in Larson v. Valente, rather than the Lemon
standard, should apply to the Establishment Clause claim. 146 In Larson,
the Supreme Court evaluated the Minnesota Charitable Solicitations Act
and its disparate impact on different denominations. 147  While the
Unification Church received more than fifty percent of its funds from
non-members and was subsequently required to report on its fundraising1. • • 148
solicitations, the legislative history of the statute revealed that the law
was designed to have no impact on the activities of another sect: a
Roman Catholic archdiocese.149  The Court raised concerns about the
"risk of politicizing religion" and found the law unconstitutional.150 The
Larson Court, citing Abington and related Establishment Clause
holdings, declared that a state law granting denominational preference
will be treated as suspect and will garner strict scrutiny.15' In a strict-
scrutiny analysis, the governmental action "must be invalidated unless it
is justified by a compelling governmental interest, and unless it is closely




146. Id. at 47-50.
147. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
148. Id. at 232.
149. Id. at 254.
150. Id. at 254-55.
151. Id. at 246. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) ("The
fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . .effect no
favoritism among sects . . .and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.");
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral
when it comes to competition between sects."); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.").
152. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
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The Adair case remains in litigation, with the Navy and plaintiffs
struggling over whether the proceedings of the Navy Chaplaincy officer
selection board members are discoverable or not.153 The most recent
rulings have allowed for the plaintiffs' discovery.
154
While the Adair proceedings continue, its use of the Larson
strict-scrutiny standard instead of the Lemon test is in keeping with
current Supreme Court jurisprudence. "Larson indicates that laws
discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny, and that
laws 'affording a benefit to all religions' should be analyzed under
Lemon. 155
In a strict-scrutiny analysis, Wiccan petitioners and defendant
administrators will likely have competing definitions of the relevant
governmental interest. The government might argue that its interest lies
in maintaining a solemn and uniform appearance in its National
Cemeteries and memorial markers. Petitioners can counter that a more
fundamental governmental interest is national defense and, by extension,
encouraging religious people of all sects and denominations to serve.
The likely argument from the government is that the National
Cemetery Administration's governmental purpose is to provide a
dignified appearance in all its grave sites and cemeteries. Accordingly, it
must limit the symbols displayed on headstones and memorial markers to
recognized religious symbols, and need not dilute the range of symbols
to accommodate every possible religious viewpoint or allow expansion
beyond symbols of military service and a service member's religion. In
pursuit of this allegedly compelling governmental interest, the National
Cemetery Administration has promulgated guidelines for the approval of
religious symbols. The government may further claim that Wiccan
petitioners have not met the burden of proving that their religious symbol
represents a comprehensive belief or faith system that has all the indicia
of more commonly-practiced religions.
Petitioners will be best served by arguing that the compelling
governmental rationale for providing emblems of belief on headstones
153. See In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
154. See Adair v. Winter, 451 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.D.C. 2006).
155. Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31, 49 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Corp. of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987) (citations omitted)).
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parallels that of establishing a chaplaincy, and is an outgrowth of
Congress's express authority to provide for the nation's defense-
authority that includes supporting the religious convictions and practices
of active and prospective American service members in order to
encourage valorous actions in combat and sacrifice for the nation.
Though the government has not used an involuntary draft program in
decades, all able-bodied male citizens, or those who have made a
declaration of intent to become citizens, from ages seventeen to forty-
five, and women who are members of the National Guard are eligible for
a draft. 15 6 Indeed, the selection of Army Chaplains has traditionally been
to provide "satisfactory services of worship and other religious
observances for the greatest possible number of military personnel."'
5 7
Though Wiccan beliefs are not uniform, the treatment of death within
Wicca is substantially similar to that of other religions. Like most faiths,
Wiccans hold a funeral or memorial service for the deceased with a
graveside prayer.158 Preparation for burial may include washing the body
with spring water while making an accompanying prayer, then wrapping
it in a shroud. 159 This practice parallels traditional Jewish and Muslim.. 160
practices. Wiccans may prefer to be cremated, and a specific prayer
may be used for such an occasion. 161 This is the dominant practice used
by both Hindus and Buddhists. 162  The argument becomes one of
fundamental purposes-before there can be veterans to be honored and a
National Cemetery Administration that approves religious symbols, there
must be an army and other services engaged in the conflicts of the nation.
Congress has raised an army and allowed Wiccans to serve in
that army, and federal courts have recognized Wicca as a religion that
occupies a position in the lives of its practitioners parallel to Christianity,
Judaism, or Islam. Wiccan petitioners are not asking for a symbol
representing political party affiliation, criticizing a national draft policy,
156. See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2000).
157. See GUSHWA, supra note 129, at 16.
158. STARHAWK & M. MACHA NIGHTMARE, THE PAGAN BOOK OF LIVING AND
DYING 160-87 (1997).
159. Id. at 151-53.
160. MICHAEL R. LEMING & GEORGE E. DICKINSON, UNDERSTANDING DYING,
DEATH, & BEREAVEMENT 150-51, 155-57 (4th ed. 1998).
161. See STARHAWK & NIGHTMARE, supra note 158, at 187.
162. See, e.g., LEMING & DICKINSON, supra note 160, at 155-57.
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or anything else that might lessen the memorial nature of a headstone or
memorial plaque. While Wicca is not a dominant religious sect, it seems
disingenuous to claim that it is so dissimilar in practice that it does not
occupy a parallel place in the lives of its practitioners to that of more
commonly-practiced religions.
Ultimately, petitioners arguing under Larson will likely win.
Unless a persuasive argument can be provided for the exclusion of
Wiccans from the military as a whole, the exclusion of their faith from
recognition on memorial markers clearly fails a strict scrutiny analysis.
2. Lynch v. Donnelly and Endorsement/Disapproval
A court analyzing the bar to Wiccan memorial markers could
also look to Lynch v. Donnelly.163  In Lynch, the Supreme Court
considered a holiday creche displayed during the Christmas holiday
season to determine whether it impermissibly advanced or endorsed
religion. The Court ultimately decided that it did not.164 Specifically, the
Court held that "the Constitution does not require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. 165 A court
may reasonably conclude that accommodation of a broad spectrum of
religions for its veterans-with thirty-eight religious symbols, but none
for Wiccans--constitutes "hostility" and is thus unconstitutional.
A possible response to the use of Lynch is that in the subsequent
County ofAllegheny v. ACL 0 66 case, the display of a creche was held to
impermissibly advance approval of Christian religious beliefs. However,
the application of Allegheny is strained in this instance. The use of a
menorah in Allegheny was upheld because it was viewed as sufficiently
secular and could be distinguished from the more inherently religious
display of a nativity scene.' 67 The display of a Christian Cross, Star of
David, or Wiccan Pentacle is inherently religious and permissible under
the language in the Lynch decision of accommodation for all religions.
163. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
164. Id. at 687.
165. Id. at 673.
166. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
167. Id. at 620-621.
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The display of atheist and humanist symbols also reduces the impact of
Allegheny here, because the inclusion of these two secular totems shows
a broader spectrum of viewpoints to include the non-religious belief on
the same footing as religious ones.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in Lynch, proposed looking at the
first two prongs of the Lemon test with regard to the impact of
questioned practices, noting that "[t]he effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under review in. , ,,168
fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. Wiccan
plaintiffs can claim that the Army's policy, though facially neutral and
accommodating of religious and non-religious viewpoints excluding their
faith. Under Justice O'Connor's analysis, this clearly conveys a message
of disapproval with regard to the Wiccan faith and may be adjudged
unconstitutional.
3. Establishment Clause Conclusions
The Establishment Clause claim represents the Wiccan
petitioners' best chance to prevail. The standing requirements are not as
stringent as Free Exercise claims, so a court may more readily reach
judgment on the merits.1 69  As demonstrated above, the petitioners'
strongest Establishment Clause argument arises from application of the
Larson standard. Arguing that the Larson standard is appropriate, and
that national defense is the governmental rationale for action in this field,
clearly invalidates refusal of a Wiccan symbol.
CONCLUSION
The denial of an emblem of belief for Wiccan veterans will
likely fail scrutiny under the First Amendment. The clearest invalidation
can come from violation of the Establishment Clause under the strict
scrutiny standard of Larson v. Valente. A reviewing court may also find
168. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration added).
169. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n. 9 (1963) ("[T]he
requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause,
unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular
religious freedoms are infringed." (alteration added)).
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Free Exercise concerns with the addition of distinctive religious emblems
for other faiths while Wiccan applicants have waited-this may
constitute a facially neutral but discriminatory measure intended to
forestall approval of a Wiccan symbol. The Establishment Clause
provides the easiest way to satisfy standing requirements, and it may be
the Wiccan petitioners' most compelling claim.
Our nation is currently engaged in combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Many of the forces fighting against us are motivated by
deep-seated religious and cultural animosity toward the values that the
United States and free Western democracies represent. 17  Sergeant
Stewart represents one of thousands of casualties from the combined
weight of these operations. One need not be a Wiccan nor endorse
Wiccan beliefs to come to the conclusion that all those who serve in this
struggle deserve recognition that is respectful of their faiths.
President Abraham Lincoln gave the most persuasive case for
honoring those who have fallen while defending our freedoms in the
Gettysburg Address in 1863.
[I]n a larger sense, we cannot dedicate-we cannot
consecrate-we cannot hallow-this ground. The
brave men, living and dead, who struggled here,
have consecrated it far above our poor power to
add or detract .... It is for us, the living, rather, to
be dedicated to the unfinished work which they
who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced.
It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great
task remaining before us-that from these honored
dead we take increased devotion to that cause for
which they gave the last full measure of devotion;
that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not
have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall
have a new birth of freedom; and that government
170. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (2001); THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 401-05 (2000); SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
(2003).
2007]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
of the people, by the people, for the people, shall
not perish from the earth. 17'
Wiccan veterans have served in and become casualties of our nation's
wars. They should be afforded the same recognition as fallen warriors of
other faiths. Certainly, this is within our poor power to add to the
consecration of their sacrifices and their memories.
171. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, reprinted in RICHARD D. HEFNER,
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 157 (5th ed. Penguin Books
1991) (alteration added).
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